unforecastable to the extent that changes in asset prices are unforecastable. There are four variables in the US model that have important effects on aggregate demand that are unforecastable or at least hard to forecast: equity prices, housing prices, import prices, and exports. Equity prices and housing prices are asset prices and hard to forecast. Import prices depend in large part on oil prices, food prices, and exchange rates, all of which are hard to forecast. U.S. exports depend on the import demands of other countries, and these demands are hard to forecast to the extent that they depend on the importing countries' asset and import prices.
The approach of this paper is to use the US model to forecast each of the 214 eight-quarter periods within the overall 1954:12009:1 period under ve assumptions: not knowing equity prices, not knowing housing prices, not knowing import prices, not knowing exports, and not knowing the residuals (i.e., the error terms in the structural equations). Not knowing the four variables means using simple baseline paths for their forecasts. Not knowing the residuals means using zero values. As will be seen, this procedure allows the overall forecast error for any eight-quarter period to be divided into ve components, which can then be examined. If the overall forecast error for a particular recession is small, the model has forecast the recession well using only baseline paths and zero residuals. This says that given the structure of the model, the initial conditions, and the values of the other exogenous variables (primarily government policy variables), the recession has been forecast. Otherwise, one or more of the components is the culprit.
There is a large literature on forecasting the probability that a recession will occur in some future quarter, in particular using the yield curve to forecast such probabilities. Two recent papers are Chauvet and Potter (2005) and Rudebusch and Williams (2008) . For example, Rudebusch and Williams dene a recession as a quarter with negative real growth and examine horizons of zero to four quarters ahead. They nd that the yield curve has some predictive power relative to predictions from professional forecasters.
There is also a large literature, recently surveyed by Stock and Watson (2003) , examining whether asset prices are useful predictors of future output growth and ination. Stock and Watson examine data on many possible predictor variables for seven countries. Using bivariate and trivariate equations, they get mixed results.
For some countries and some periods some asset prices are useful predictors, but the predictive relations are far from stable. This paper is not an examination of possible single-equation predictive relationships. Instead, a structural model of the economy, which has already been estimated, is used. Consider, for example, the role of equity prices. In the US model household wealth lagged one quarter is a signicant and important explanatory variable in the estimated consumption equations. If equity prices rise, household wealth increases, which leads to an increase in consumption demand.
Equity prices are thus estimated in the model to affect aggregate demand. These relationships have been estimated and found to be statistically signicant. This paper is not a test of them. The aim is to see how the US model's forecasts are affected by knowing or not knowing the path of equity prices over the forecast period. The same is true for housing prices, import prices, and exports. These variables are estimated to have important effects on the economy, and the aim is to see how the model's forecasts are affected by knowing or not knowing them.
This study is thus conditional on the estimated structure of the US model. (i.e., estimated) values, the baseline path for equity prices is used, and actual values for the other three variables are used. The error from this forecast measures how much of the baseline error is due to not knowing equity prices. The third, fourth, and fth forecasts are similar to the second, where the selected variable is, respectively, housing prices, import prices, and exports.
Letê it denote the forecast error for forecast i, i = 1, . . . , 5. It turns out, as will be seen, that the sum of these ve errors is very close toê t . So this procedure essentially divides up the baseline error into ve components: not knowing the residuals, not knowing equity prices, not knowing housing prices, not knowing import prices, and not knowing exports. This paper is an analysis of these components for the eight-quarter periods. The identity for AH is
where SH is the nancial saving of the household sector and DISH is an exogenous discrepancy term. CG thus affects real wealth through this denition. In fact, the main uctuations in AH are due to uctuations in CG. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. Tables 1 and 2 present a subset of these resultsthose relating to recessions and booms. • t + 7 = last quarter of eight-quarter prediction period.
• GDP R = real GDP.
•
• MAE for the 214 observations: 1.025 forê t and 0.685 forê 1t .
• for the others. Column 9 presents the error from this forecast. This is the error from not knowing exports. Column 10 is the sum of columns 5 through 9.
The tables show that for each period the value in column 4, the baseline error, is close to the value in column 10, the sum of the ve components. The ve errors in columns 5 through 9 can thus be considered to be components of the baseline error in column 4. Note also that there is a high degree of serial correlation going down the columns in Tables A1 and A2 because of the overlapping eight-quarter forecast periods.
Mean Absolute Errors
The mean absolute error of the baseline error (column 4) for the 214 observations in Table A1 (eight-quarter growth rate at an annual rate) is 1.025 percentage points.
This error is based on not knowing the residuals and not knowing the actual values ! Also, the latest revised data are used for this work, not the actual data that existed at the time. In addition, the specication of the model is the latest one, which would not have been known, say, at the beginning of 1954.
Results for Output Growth Table 1 contains selected observations from Table A1 . Observations were selected that had the smallest actual growth rates (recessions) and the largest actual growth rates (booms). The recession observations were chosen as follows. The actual growth rates were ranked, and observations were chosen working from the bottom up with the restriction that a previous observation had not been chosen within 12 quarters of the observation in question. In other words, a window of at least 12 quarters was used. The same procedure was followed for booms, working from the top down.
The last quarter for each recession observation in Table 1 is close to the trough quarter of an NBER designated recession, as noted in the footnote to the table.
However, the NBER designated two recessions in the early 1980s, 1980:11980:3 and 1981:31982:4, whereas in this paper this period is considered to be one long recession. The worst eight-quarter period within this overall period ended in 1983:1, which had a growth rate of -0.51 percent, and this is the period used in Table 1 . In the following discussion the recessions and booms will be denoted by the last quarter of the eight-quarter period.
Tolstoy said that Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. If we substitute booms for happy families and recessions for unhappy families, this summarizes the results in Table 1 Regarding the Great Depression, Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro (1988) show that forecasters did not see it coming and that a VAR model using historical data now available also does not forecast it. A structural model was not tried in this paper, and so components of the overall forecast error are not available. The US model cannot be used for this purpose because it is based on data beginning in 1952. In future work, however, it might be interesting to see if a structural model t through the 1920s and 1930s could determine the components of the overall forecast error. Table 2 contains selected observations from Table A2 • t + 7 = last quarter of eight-quarter prediction period.
Results for Ination
• GDP D = GDP deator.
• MAE for the 214 observations: 1.130 forê t and 0.720 forê 1t .
the second and third periods. Table 3 for output growth and in Table 4 for ination. The results in Tables 3 and 4 differ from those in Tables 1   and 2 Tables 3 and 4 are from those in Tables 1 and 2 . The results are in fact similar. For output growth in Table 3 For ination in Table 4 the results are again similar, with the P IM component being • t + 7 = last quarter of eight-quarter prediction period.
The key question is how different the results in
• y t = 100[(GDP R t+7 /GDP R t−1 )
• MAE for the 96 observations: 1.048 forê t and 0.759 forê 1t .
• • t + 7 = last quarter of eight-quarter prediction period.
• MAE for the 96 observations: 0.989 forê t and 0.837 forê 1t .
the largest for both periods. The general conclusions are thus not sensitive to the use of within sample forecasts.
Another check is to see if the results are sensitive to the choice of an eightquarter forecast period. To examine this, the calculations were repeated using a ve-quarter period. There are 217 ve-quarter periods within the overall 1954:1
2009:1 period. The results for output growth are presented in Table 5 . Some • t + 4 = last quarter of ve-quarter prediction period.
• y t = 100[(GDP R t+4 /GDP R t−1 )
• MAE for the 217 observations: 1.306 forê t and 0.963 forê 1t .
• NBER trough quarters: 1958:2, 1961: 1, 1970:4, 1975:1, 1982:4, 1991:1, 2001:4. of the periods are slightly different because they were chosen using the ranking of the ve-quarter growth rates rather than the eight-quarter rates. The mean absolute error for the baseline error for the 217 observations is 1.306 percentage points. For the residual component it is 0.963 percentage points.
The results between Tables 1 and 5 are again similar, and no major conclusions are changed. Comparing Table 5 to Table 1 justied. The assumption here, given the use of the latest data, is thus that forecasters are trying to forecast reality, not some preliminary estimate of reality. If they are in fact trying to forecast some preliminary estimate, the following results will be at least a little off.
Mean absolute errors (MAEs) are presented in Table 6 . Eight-quarter-ahead forecasts are available for the US model within sample (USws), the US model outside sample (USos), and the US model ex ante (USea). • USws = within sample forecasts.
• USos = outside sample forecasts.
• USea = ex ante forecasts, US model.
• SPFea = ex ante forecasts, median SPF forecasts.
• Values for USws and USos not in parentheses are MAEs for baseline error.
• Values for USws and USos in parentheses are MAEs for residual component.
to USos, and USea is in between these two. These ination comparisons have the disadvantage that the common period does not include any of the period of the large increases in P IM , and in this sense it is not a representative sample.
Results for the ve-quarter-ahead forecasts are presented in the bottom half of forecasts for the ve-quarter-ahead forecasts and the common sample period, the MAE for USea is slightly smaller than that for SPFea (1.000 versus 1.124).
For ination there is a large decrease in the MAEs for USws in moving from the rst common period to the second. For the rst common period the MAE for SPFea is larger than both MAEs for USws. This is also true for the second common period. For USos, on the other hand, the MAE for SPFea is smaller than both MAEs for USos. The same is true for the MAE for USea. Again, the MAE for USea is slightly smaller than the MAE for SPFea (0.698 versus 0.724).
Overall, the results for the growth rate are what would be expected, namely that the accuracy of errors from ex ante forecasts is likely to be between that from baseline errors and that from residual errors. This is not true for ination, but the common sample period may be a problem. 1955. The US versus DSGE Models I have argued elsewhere that a model like the US model is a better approximation of the economy than are currently popular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. The most extensive discussion is in Fair (2007, Section 2). Table A3 is a slightly modied version of Table 2 in this paper; it summarizes some of the main points.
The reference in the last point in Table A3 Micro theory is behind the specication of household and rm behavior. The estimated equations are meant to be approximations to decision equations that result from optimization problems. Theory is used to decide what is on the left hand and right hand sides of the estimated equations. People using the DSGE methodology don't like this way of using theory because it is not as tight as that used in DSGE work. It is considered ad hoc. But my view is that this is exactly the way theory should be used. Any more restrictive or rigorous use of theory is likely to push beyond what the data can tell us. Macroeconomic data are highly aggregated, and there is a limit to what one can expect to learn from the data. 
